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In this paper I will discuss two interrelated questions: (1) What role, if any, should the
European Union (EU) play in the development of social policy? (2) Does the proper role
of the EU, as we would define it when answering the first question, require any changes
to be made to the Treaty? If the answer to the second question is positive, the European
Convention and the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) offer a unique
opportunity to include the desired changes in a new European Treaty.
My discussion of the EU's role in social policy will not be exhaustive. I will concentrate
mainly on the development of social protection, thus not going into employment policy
and related issues. Nor will I relate the discussion on social protection to the discussion on
how Member States can maintain the necessary funding for social programmes in a
context of "tax competition", nor to the debate on the future of the structural funds. This
is not to say that these discussions are not important, quite on the contrary. However, my
aim here is to examine the impact of the EU on the typical work of a national minister
who is responsible for social protection (including health care), and what kind of EU such
a minister would like to see develop now, and after the Convention.
In the first part of my paper, I will provide a succinct answer to my first question,
concerning the role of the EU in social protection policy. In the second part, I will present
a brief survey of the European agenda of "social protection" ministers as it stands today,
and suggest short-term proposals for the further development of that agenda, which do not
presuppose changes to the Treaty. My second part will show that the social protection
agenda has gained some momentum since the Lisbon Summit of March 2000, but also
that it remains politically and institutionally fragile. In the third part of my paper, I will
elaborate on six proposals concerning the Treaty. These proposals answer to the questions
raised in the first part and to the post-Lisbon experience discussed in the second part.
1 What Role Should the EU Play in the Development of Social Protection
Policy?
What role, if any, should the EU play in the development of social protection policy? In
order to give a coherent response to this question, we should first assess the facts: what
role does the EU play in the development of social protection?
In an excellent textbook on policy-making in the European Union, Stephan Leibfried and
Paul Pierson summarize the facts as follows: "The process of European integration has
eroded both the sovereignty (by which we mean legal authority) and autonomy (by which
we mean de facto regulatory capacity) of member states in the realm of social policy.
National welfare states remain the primary institutions of European social policy, but they
do so in the context of an increasingly constraining multi-tiered polity."[2] In addition to
direct pressures on national welfare states resulting from social policy initiatives
undertaken by the European institutions, the dynamics of market integration have created
indirect pressures on national welfare states, de jure, through the direct imposition of
market compatibility requirements by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and de facto
by the forces of economic competition in an integrated market.
1.1 Diminished Legal Authority Through Market Compatibility Requirements
Direct imposition of market compatibility requirements, or "negative policy reform", asLeibfried and Pierson call it, mainly occurs through the application of two fundamental
freedoms provided for in the Treaty: the free movement of workers and the freedom to
provide services.
The application of the principle of free movement of workers implies that,
– firstly, a Member State may no longer limit most social benefits to its citizens;
– secondly, a Member State may no longer insist that its benefits only apply to its
territory and thus may only be enjoyed there;
– thirdly, although a Member State is still largely free to prevent other social policy
systems from directly competing on its own territory with the regime it has built, it is
no longer entirely able to do so;
– fourthly, Member States do not have an exclusive right to administer migrants' claims
to welfare benefits.
The application of the principle of free movement of services is closely linked to the fact
that the treaties, as well as secondary European law, focus on economic activity and
entrepreneurial freedoms. The question is obviously: Do welfare state services constitute
an economic activity? If so, the freedom to provide financial or social services would
apply, as would the general European competition regime, implying, for example, that
Member governments can no longer exclusively decide who may provide social services
or benefits.
Fortunately, European integration does acknowledge non-economic true welfare activity.
However, there is no general exemption for welfare state activity from the treaty's market
freedoms, and the distinction between "economic" and "welfare" (or "solidarity") activity
is not always clear-cut. Hence, drawing - and continually redrawing - this fine line
between "economic" and "solidarity" activity is what much of the legal conflict and
judgements of the ECJ are about.
In an outstanding report for last year's Belgian Presidency of the EU, Professor Elias
Mossialos[3] and his team have shown that, in particular in the field of health care, there
are significant prospects for a substantial remoulding of national policies through this
"market filter". As Leibfried and Pierson also stress, this is mainly due to the fact that
health insurance has more "market characteristics" in most national systems, is more
fragmented into provider groups which already operate in markets (medical instruments,
pharmaceuticals) or quasi-markets (doctors in private practice sickness funds) and has in
most countries been traditionally exposed to substantial private provision. Moreover,
national reforms have been increasingly geared to "market cures" and de-regulation in
recent decades. To the extent that these reforms move social insurance away from
redistribution and solidarity, it is clear that beyond an as yet unidentified threshold, such
programmes would become just another economic enterprise that must compete with
private health insurance and other competitors on a level playing field.[4]
The example of health care shows that it would certainly be simplistic to blame "Europe"
for the problems national social policy makers are confronted with, as if "Europe"
enforced market solutions upon reluctant Member States. As a matter of fact, instead of
asking the question "Do welfare state services constitute economic activity?" one could
put forward a slightly different question: "To what extent do Member States believe they
can organise their domestic welfare services as an economic activity?"
The actual consequences of the application of the European competition regime andinternal market rules have repeatedly been illustrated in rulings issued by the European
Court of Justice. Let me give just one example. In the Kohll[5] and Decker[6] rulings, the
Court considered that by demanding prior authorization for the reimbursement of
orthodontic treatment and the purchase of spectacles outside its territory, the Luxembourg
health insurance rules had created an unjustified impediment to the free movement of
goods and services within the European Union. Consequently, the Luxembourg social
security system was forced to reimburse this unauthorised health care in another Member
State. Even though I will explain later that these rulings were more nuanced than first
thought (Section 3.2), they did make it clear again that social security systems, even if a
matter of national competence, were not exempt from European law.
Moreover, the Kohll and Decker rulings create a dual system of social cover for health
care:
– On the one hand there is the procedure governed by the EC regulation on the
coordination of social security (Regulation 1408/71, to which I will refer in Section
2.4). This Regulation integrates the patient who has received authorization from his
or her social security institution into the social protection system where he receives
the medical treatment, "as though he were insured with it". This mainly implies that
the patient is subject to the same cost sharing and the same regulations (e.g. referral
for specialist care), and that costs are settled between both social protection systems
according to the tariffs of the State where treatment was delivered. Mobile persons
temporarily become "members" of the host country's health care system.
– On the other hand, patients using the procedure created by Kohll and Decker are not
integrated into the social protection system of another Member State but, when
returning to their country of residence, claim the coverage of their home country's
social protection system "as if they received the treatment there". This would mean
that reimbursement in the State of residence is subject to the conditions and
according to the tariffs applicable there.[7]
This duality not only creates some complexity and scope for confusion, it poses a more
fundamental problem. The traditional procedure allows (conditioned) mobility, yet it
preserves the internal cohesion of national health care systems. The Kohll and Decker
procedure introduces a degree of freedom, which, if unlimited, may disrupt the internal
cohesion of national health care systems. Thus, it might lead both to increasing
inequalities in access to health care and to increasing problems when it comes to
guaranteeing the quality of care to patients - two essential objectives European national
health ministers generally want to achieve. This is not to say that increased patient
mobility is intrinsically problematic. On the contrary, I believe increasing patient mobility
can, for a number of reasons, be very positive if developed in the right kind of
framework. For instance, it would allow the development of a system of European centres
of excellence, especially for highly specialised medical treatments, as well as new and
experimental therapies; it would allow to reap the full benefits from cross-border co-
operation projects; or, to organise tangible solidarity between Member States with
particular difficulties in the field of health care. However, the nature of the framework we
apply to organise patient mobility will be crucial.
A practical example may illustrate what I mean. Suppose UK citizens were entitled to
health care anywhere in Europe, in Belgium for instance, without prior authorization,
with the NHS having to reimburse the costs. Mobility of patients would create
opportunities for the UK government and its citizens: it would provide an immediate
solution for waiting lists, whilst the extra investment the UK government is currentlyundertaking takes time to produce practical results; and, in so far as the NHS would
consider contracting-out its patients to the private sector within the UK, transparent and
well-organised price competition between the British private sector and health care
providers in the rest of Europe might be beneficial (since supply would be increased).
However, free patient mobility also entails significant risks, both for the UK government
and for its citizens: not just the risk of an uncontrollable bill (as the UK government
cannot monitor cost-efficiency abroad), but also potential problems with regard to the
quality of care, given the asymmetry of information that characterizes the health care
sector. From the point of view of the Belgian health sector, mobility of British patients
would create opportunities, such as extra revenue. But simultaneously, mobility of
patients, if based on a "Kohll and Decker" type of procedure and not on the traditional
procedure provided by Regulation 1408/71, might fuel the development of a "two-speed"
health care system in Belgium, if British patients were to be treated at "free" tariffs (that
is, tariffs not conforming to the Belgian national convention on tariffs). Indeed, a growing
influx of patients from abroad, based upon Kohll and Decker, might nourish the
development of an increasingly important "non-convention" sector within Belgian health
care, a development we would certainly not like to see.
One can also imagine other interactions between Member States. If a Member State X
decided to semi-privatise part of its domestic health care system, the application of a
"Kohll and Decker" type approach to patient mobility may, to some extent, favour
privatisation of health care activity in neighbouring countries. In other words, when it
comes to patient mobility, the fundamental question is: Will we create opportunities, by
offering new solutions to European patients with respect to the built-in solidarity of our
systems, or will we simply export our problems to each other?
1.2 Diminished Autonomy Due to de facto Pressures on Welfare States
De facto indirect pressures on welfare states are the result of enhanced competition within
the single market as well as of the economic and budgetary policies promoted by the EU.
I believe one should avoid cheap talk about "social dumping going on in the EU".
Intensifying competition in an integrated market is only one of the many challenges our
national welfare states are facing. Today, our welfare systems are under strain primarily
because (a) the traditional fields of social protection, such as pensions and health care,
require greater resources, and (b) because new social risks and needs have emerged.
Furthermore, we know from experience that European integration does not necessarily
lead to retrenchment. Indeed, in many countries the single market led to renewed
agreements between the social partners and consequently to the rethinking - rather than
the retrenchment - of their welfare states.
Nevertheless, it would be naïve just to extrapolate.[8] Economic and monetary integration
and the growing importance of capital and labour mobility within the Union will leave a
bigger mark on the architecture of our welfare states in the long run. Furthermore, in the
short term, we are on the eve of the enlargement of the Union. In other words, the history
of integration still has to be written. When it comes to the actual impact of European
integration on welfare state development, the jury is still out, although economic theory is
quite clear on this issue. For instance, economists have long recognised the potential
dangers of increased mobility leading to a loss of the tax base (perhaps even to "tax
competition") with consequential effects on the capacity of EU Member States to finance
their social programmes.Pressure on welfare states is not just the result of market integration, but is also created by
the follow-up of Member States' economic policies through the EU's Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines and multilateral surveillance, and the assessment of the budgetary
situation of the Member States through the annual stability plans. To be sure, recognizing
that these political processes create pressure by no means implies that the considerable
attention in the EU to sound public finances is to be swept under the carpet. On the
contrary, sound and sustainable public finances are a conditio sine qua non for a sound
and sustainable social policy, which is evidently a major issue in our ageing societies.
However, a focus on financial prudence always carries with it the danger that one
myopically economises on what would be sound and necessary investment. Social
investments are no exception to this observation. Intelligent social investment is much
needed for two reasons: to answer the increasing expectations of our citizens concerning
the quality of today's public services in general (a matter of public concern in many
Member States, and one of the sensitive issues in recent elections); and, secondly, to
prepare our welfare states for the future, given the reality of ageing. It may be the case
that a "straightforward" shift of costs to the private sector lightens budgetary burdens, but
on the other hand this may offer few substantive solutions to tricky issues such as quality,
equity and justice - it may even lead to less quality, equity and justice.[9] Hence, sound
public finances should be accompanied by sound social investment. Whilst there is
tangible EU pressure (and rightly so) for sound public finances, there is, so far,
comparatively little EU pressure for intelligent social investment.
1.3 Common Objectives and Legitimate Diversity
A sober assessment of the facts, together with uncontroversial economic theory, points to
two conclusions.
Firstly, it seems fair to say that Member States have lost more control over national
welfare policies in the face of pressures from integrated markets than the EU has de facto
gained in transferred authority, substantial though the latter may be. Thus, there is a
growing gap in our steering capacity with regard to welfare policy. This is problematic,
since the combination of diminished Member State autonomy and authority and continued
weakness in developing responses at EU level may restrict both the scope and the
pressure for innovative social investment, which is needed everywhere given the common
challenges - for health care and elderly care, and for pension systems - created by the
dynamics of demographic ageing. The problem will be exacerbated by EU enlargement
because the requirement of unanimity in the Council for important areas of social policy
entails the risk of paralysis of decision-making in the social field, and, probably even
more importantly, because enlargement will bring about dramatic increases in the
economic, social, politico-cultural and politico-institutional heterogeneity among EU
Member States.[10]
Secondly, in a context of increased mobility, not just of workers and capital, but also of
service organisations, care providers and patients, the Treaty constellation might prioritise
two polarised trajectories, as Leibfried and Pierson fear: core welfare state components
(redistribution, pay-as-you-go, etc.) would remain "intervention-free", to the extent that
they are "pure" welfare; but the more these functions are provided by market-based
services, the more the welfare state (in whole or in parts) would tilt towards the sphere of
"economic action" from the point of view of the EU institutions, thus becoming subject to
single market principles and market regimes. Thereby the welfare state could gradually besubmerged into a single European "security" market, that is, a single market for personal
protection and insurance instruments.[11] There are fundamental and well-known
economic reasons (information asymmetry, adverse selection, etc.) as to why market
principles and social security are no easy twins, neither at national level, nor at European
level. As I will argue below, the Court has, so far, followed a cautious path, with
sufficient nuances and due respect for the prerequisites of national welfare policies. Yet,
although it would be unfair to blame "Europe" for some of the difficulties facing national
social policy makers if they choose to rely more on market or quasi-market mechanisms
in their welfare provision (as I emphasized in Section 1.1), the Treaty provides no robust
guarantee against a polarised development as feared by Leibfried and Pierson.
It is not a matter of political opinion but a matter of fact that the economic and
institutional dynamics of creating a single market have made it increasingly difficult to
exclude social issues from the EU's agenda: "The tidy separation between market issues,
belonging to the supranational sphere, and social issues, belonging to the national spheres,
is unsustainable."[12] However, the answer to this problem is not an additional transfer of
national competencies to the EU, nor the imposition of uniformity, let alone
harmonisation for the sake of harmonisation. Although I will stress that the concept of "a
European social model" not only makes sense but should be specified by means of
"common objectives," I also think national governments could not possibly agree on a
detailed European blueprint for the core functions of the welfare state. As Fritz Scharpf
rightly argues, any attempt to override legitimate diversity by imposing uniform European
solutions could blow the Union apart. National diversity cannot be treated as illegitimate;
on the contrary, it is itself part of the legitimating structure of beliefs and practices
supporting the multilevel European polity.[13]
Although there is a proper role for EU legislation in the social domain (and decision
making has to become more efficient in this domain, as I argue in section 3.4), social
protection policy is and should primarily remain the responsibility of municipalities,
regions and nation states. Nevertheless, Europe should enable the Member States to
develop "active welfare states" and encourage intelligent social investment, by indicating
the broad objectives, both where employment and social protection are concerned. And
cross-border mobility should create additional opportunities for intelligent welfare
solutions, rather than make welfare policies more difficult to sustain.
2 The Post-Lisbon Challenge: Turning Principles of Co-operation Into
Operational Practice
This approach to EU social policy - that the EU needs an operational social policy
concept, yet that it is not synonymous with imposing uniformity, nor with a transfer of
competences - inspired the Belgian Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2001. Our
leitmotiv was to put the principles agreed at the Lisbon Summit of March 2000 into
practice, building on the work done by the French and the Swedish Presidencies which
followed the Portuguese Presidency. These "Lisbon principles" - as I would call them -
hinged both on a substantive idea (economic performance and social cohesion are not
mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing objectives, between which a new equilibrium
has to be found) and on a methodological proposal, coined "open method of co-
ordination". The Portuguese Presidency moreover had a precise ambition concerning the
"leadership" of European co-ordination: it intended to enhance the steering and co-
ordinating role of the European Council, and attempted to reduce the virtually exclusive
competence of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) over the BroadEconomic Policy Guidelines and to take employment and social concerns into account in
their drafting.[14]
With regard to social protection, our ambition "to implement Lisbon" implied three goals:
firstly, to make European co-operation in the fight against poverty and social exclusion
operational; secondly, to launch the open method of co-ordination in the field of
pensions; thirdly, to prepare the ground for reforming the current rules governing the co-
ordination of social security schemes for mobile citizens (Regulation 1408/71).[15] The
third priority - social security co-ordination - belongs to the realm of EU legislation, or
"hard law"; the first two issues belong to the realm of the "open method of co-
ordination", or "soft law".
I will discuss the notion of open co-ordination in section 2.1. Next I will summarize what
has been achieved so far with regard to social inclusion, pensions and social security co-
ordination in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, and indicate a number of short-term challenges. In
section 2.5 I touch upon the prospects for developing the open method of co-ordination in
the field of health care and care for the elderly. In sections 2.6 and 2.7 I will briefly
address two other instruments of policy making, which also have their role to play: EU
legislation and social dialogue. Together with the questions raised in Part 1, this
description of our current experience sets the scene for my discussion of necessary Treaty
changes in Part 3.
2.1 The Open Method of Co-ordination as a Creative Instrument [16]
The methodological foundations for the open method of co-ordination as a new Europe-
wide approach to social policy were formally laid down at the Lisbon European Council
in March 2000. Before that, policy co-ordination at EU-level had been applied to
economic policy (multilateral surveillance of national economic policies, provided for in
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty) as well as in the field of employment (the Luxemburg
process, formalised by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty as "co-ordinated strategy for
employment" and fine-tuned by the Luxembourg European Council the same year). In
what follows, I distinguish the "policy co-ordination" that had been established before the
Lisbon Summit, for which a formal basis exists in the Treaty, and the "open method of
co-ordination" as it was defined in Lisbon. Together they constitute however one
"cookbook" of soft-law methodologies, and in the political debate these methodologies
are often conflated under the general heading of "open co-ordination".[17]
In a nutshell, the open method of co-ordination is a process in which clear and mutually
agreed objectives are defined, after which peer review, on the basis of national action
plans, enables EU Member States to compare practices and learn from each other. This
method respects - and is in fact built on - local diversity; it is flexible, but it aims to
promote progress in the social sphere. An efficient learning process requires the use of
comparable and commonly agreed indicators in order to monitor progress towards the
common goals, as well as evaluation and, possibly, soft recommendations made by the
European Commission and the Council. The exchange of reliable information aims - at
least to some extent - at institutionalising intelligent "policy mimicking".[18]
Because it is pragmatic, this "open" approach can effectively lead to social progress. Thus,
we have found a way that implies a credible commitment to a social Europe.
Consequently, we are sending important messages to European citizens. For instance, the
explicit formulation of a European social agenda can be seen as a "defensive shield"against a possible retrenchment of our welfare states in the light of economic unification.
However, I believe the added value of the open method of co-ordination goes beyond
being a technical learning process and beyond preventing welfare retrenchment in Europe.
Defining commonly agreed objectives is much more than merely a useful technique in
view of the intended progress in the Member States. Common objectives are essential
because they allow us to translate the much discussed but rather abstract "European social
model" into a tangible set of agreed objectives to be rooted in European co-operation. For
the first time, thanks to the open method of co-ordination, this abstract concept is being
interpreted by means of more precise definitions of the outcomes we want to achieve.
Echoing Anton Hemerijck,[19] I would say that the open method of co-ordination is both
a cognitive and a normative tool. It is a "cognitive" tool, because it allows us to learn
from each other. In my opinion, this learning process is not restricted to the practice of
other Member States, but also extends to their underlying views and opinions, an area that
is no less important. Open co-ordination is a "normative" tool because, necessarily,
common objectives embody substantive views on social justice. Thus open co-ordination
gradually creates a European social policy paradigm.
Open co-ordination is not some kind of fixed recipe that can be applied to any issue. Our
methodology in the field of social inclusion (see section 2.2) differs from the policy co-
ordination that has been developed with the 1997 Luxembourg Employment Process on
the basis of Art. 128 of the Treaty. (In the Employment Process, a report is submitted
every year. On the basis of this report, individual recommendations are made to individual
Member States). Our methodology with regard to pensions will differ in turn from that
applied to social inclusion: It consists of a fairly light process, where Member States
report to each other every three or four years on how they include commonly agreed
objectives in their national policy, with a yearly update which will enable us to integrate
common conclusions on pension policy into the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines drawn
up by the Union every year. In other words, policy co-ordination and open co-ordination
together constitute a cookbook that contains various recipes, lighter and heavier ones.
Elsewhere, I have emphasised that when using this cookbook we have to bear certain key
principles in mind.[20] Firstly, this is only one method amongst others. We cannot fly to
a social Europe on the wing of open co-ordination alone. We also need another wing,
namely legislative work. Therefore, the open method of co-ordination must not replace
legislative work where it is necessary. Secondly, we must not confuse the objectives with
the instruments of social policy. Confusing these elements goes against the spirit of
subsidiarity that is fundamental to the open method of co-ordination. Moreover, lack of
clarity with regard to fundamental objectives leads to biased policy analysis.[21] The third
principle is "comprehensiveness": we have to include all possible tools in the
analysis.[22] The fourth principle concerns the choice of benchmarks we use when we
want to put objectives into practice: When we define our standards, we have to be
realistic and ambitious at the same time. We definitely need best practices in the learning
process: feasible "standards of excellence" instead of standards of mediocrity. The fifth -
and final - principle for the useful application of the open method of co-ordination is
located at a practical level. We cannot possibly measure progress without comparable and
quantifiable indicators. For this reason, finding an agreement on a set of indicators with
regard to social inclusion was a top priority for the Belgian Presidency of the EU. For the
same reason, we now want to develop a set of pension indicators. It seems to me that this
fifth principle is the actual litmus test for the political readiness to engage in open co-
ordination. Anyone who paid lip service to this method should put their words into actionwhen it comes to the development of indicators. Related to the fifth principle is the need
for statistical capacity building at the EU level.
The "soft" character of open co-ordination is often met with scepticism. Yet, I believe
that by means of "soft" co-operation and consensus building we can go far beyond
solemn but vague declarations at European Summits. Admittedly, as far as social
inclusion and protection are concerned, the jury on the results of open co-ordination is
still out. Nevertheless, I think we are entitled to extrapolate (mutatis mutandis) from our
experience in the field of employment. The first comprehensive test as to whether the
policy co-ordination applied to employment is actually able to meet the high expectations
will be the mid-term evaluation of the Luxemburg process. In July 2002 the European
Commission will present a Communication in which it will evaluate the employment
strategy, based on an analysis of the national impact assessments. As far as the Belgian
impact assessment is concerned, the report rightly states that "there is no doubt
whatsoever that the employment and labour market policies have been modified by the
European employment guidelines. […] The European employment strategy brought about
changes and innovations in all branches of employment policy […]. Co-ordination
between the different levels of government has evolved in the positive sense since the
introduction of the National Action Plans in 1998."
One may conclude that the "convergence stress" has been very real, and tangible results
can be indicated. The assessments will without doubt highlight that the impact has varied
among the Member States, and the assessments will be critical of a number of issues. If
the assessment report written by the Belgian institutions is representative, there will be
criticism, amongst others, of the lack of evaluation mechanisms and of the fact that a
report must be produced every year. This gives rise to an increase in what are sometimes
irrelevant short-term measures, because new measures need to be thought up every year,
at the cost of efficiency in the longer term.
Legitimate questions are raised, notably by the European Parliament, about the relation
between open co-ordination and democratic decision making in Europe. One of the
potential gains of open policy co-ordination is that it requires all national governments to
prepare and discuss their policy reforms in public, and this, moreover, simultaneously.
Open co-ordination definitely implies "openness" in that sense too. On the other hand, the
absence of formal involvement of the European Parliament points to a democratic deficit.
This constitutes an important issue for the debate on the future of Europe's institutions
that will be prepared by the Convention.
In more general terms, a potential risk with the further development of the open method
of co-ordination is that it might gradually change the actual balance between the
European institutions - the Parliament, the Council, the Commission - in an undesirable
way, which is detrimental both for the Parliament and the Commission. Not only, open
co-ordination must not replace other policy tools that have proven their usefulness; it
should not be an instrument against either the Commission or the Parliament. Moreover,
without involvement of the Commission, effective open co-ordination itself is difficult to
envisage.
Let me therefore conclude this section by emphasising again that open co-ordination is
not a panacea, let alone a magic formula for social policy. Yet, an effective open method
of co-ordination is more than an intelligently managed learning process and a defensive
instrument. If we employ it judiciously, open co-ordination is a proactive and creative
method that allows us to define "social Europe" in more specific terms and to anchor itfirmly as a common collective good at the heart of European co-operation.
2.2 Combating Poverty and Promoting Social Inclusion
Eradicating poverty and promoting social inclusion constituted one of the key ambitions
set out by the Lisbon European Council of March 2000. In December 2000, a political
agreement was reached on common objectives with regard to social inclusion and, at the
beginning of 2001, the Member States were called upon to submit national action plans
on social inclusion. By the end of 2001, we were able:
– to adopt a first joint EU report on social inclusion, containing both an analysis of the
national action plans on social inclusion laid down by each Member State last year in
June, as well as "soft recommendations" for Member States' policies;
– to adopt a set of 18 quantitative indicators on social exclusion within the EU Member
States.[23] They will now enable each country to accurately measure the current
situation and the evolution of social exclusion, as a multidimensional concept, in a
comparable way. This first set covers four dimensions of social exclusion: financial
poverty, employment, health and education. The best known example of these
indicators is the "low income rate", defined as the percentage of individuals living in
households where the total household income is below 60 per cent of the median
national income; it indicates the percentage of individuals who are at "risk of
poverty". Other indicators are: the rate of "persistent low income"; the rate of persons
with low educational attainment; regional cohesion; the rate of people living in jobless
households; the proportion of early school leavers not in further education or training;
self-perceived health status according to income level; and the proportion of the long-
term and very long-term unemployed;
– to approve a four-year action programme, which was launched on 1 January 2002 and
aims at stimulating co-operation between policy makers, social partners, NGO's,
scientists and the socially excluded.
Thus, one "round" of open co-ordination has been implemented, and with the commonly
agreed indicators the method can become fully operational. Moreover, further progress is
on the agenda. During the second half of this year, the Danish Presidency will have to
engage in an assessment and a review of the common objectives on social inclusion that
were agreed at the Nice European Summit. In my opinion, this review should be
restricted to a limited number of important issues, such as the mainstreaming of the
gender issue in the inclusion process and the commitment of the Member States to setting
national poverty targets, which can be linked to the commonly agreed indicators. As the
indicators are multidimensional, a pragmatic way to make progress would be to require
the Member States to present targets, but to give them the possibility to choose their own
priority target(s).
With a view to enlargement, I very much appreciate the fact the European Commission
has engaged in bilateral discussions with the accession countries. From this summer
onwards, accession countries will start preparing their own national reports called "Joint
Inclusion Memoranda" (JIM's), based on National Action Plans on social inclusion so that
they will be ready to immediately become members of the Social Protection Committee
and fully engage in the open method of co-ordination in this field as soon as enlargement
takes place. As I indicate in section 3.3, we should now prepare the implementation of the
open method of co-ordination after enlargement - and where necessary, adapt it - both in
terms of its practical feasibility, and in terms of its legal entrenchment.2.3 Pensions: A Social Challenge With Financial Constraints
Regarding pensions, the Employment and Social Affairs Council and the Economic and
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) and later the European Councils in Laeken and
Barcelona, agreed on 11 common objectives and a working method for European co-
operation in this field.[24] These common objectives refer to the adequacy of pensions,
the financial sustainability of pension systems and their modernisation in response to
changing societal needs. The Belgian Presidency very explicitly wanted an integrated
approach, encompassing both a concern for financial sustainability and a concern for the
adequacy of pensions.[25] This broad perspective has been institutionalised by including
both the Employment and Social Affairs Council and ECOFIN in this process, but also by
the explicit request that the results be integrated into the Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines. This should allow Europe to speak with one - balanced - voice on pensions
for the first time.
An integrated approach is indeed reflected in the 11 objectives. For instance, the first
common objective states that Member States should "ensure that older people are not
placed at risk of poverty and can enjoy a decent standard of living; that they share in the
economic well-being of their country and can accordingly participate actively in public,
social and cultural life." According to the sixth objective Member States should also
"reform pensions systems in appropriate ways taking into account the overall objective of
maintaining the sustainability of public finances. At the same time sustainability of
pension systems needs to be accompanied by sound fiscal policies, including, where
necessary, a reduction of debt. Strategies adopted to meet this objective may also include
setting up dedicated pension reserve funds." According to yet another objective, Member
States are required to "ensure, through appropriate regulatory frameworks and through
sound management, that private and public funded pension schemes can provide pensions
with the required efficiency, affordability, portability and security."
Member States also agreed to draft a first National Strategic Report on pensions by
September 2002. In this report they will elaborate on their efforts made at national level
to meet the common objectives. Finally, Member States have agreed to start developing
indicators for assessing and monitoring action in the field of pensions. I believe the
forthcoming Danish Presidency should give priority to the development of common
indicators in the field of pensions, so that we can assess the progress in this area by the
end of this year. A final agreement should be possible by the end of 2003, under the
Italian Presidency.
Still in the field of pensions, next year's Presidencies, namely those of Greece and Italy,
will have to ensure that the work on pensions is truly integrated into the Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines. This is important in view of the fact that our European open method of
co-ordination approach to pensions is the result of long and sometimes difficult
negotiations which aimed, successfully, at striking a balance between two formations of
the Council, ECOFIN and the Employment and Social Affairs Council. It would be
unacceptable for the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, which are an important
instrument (provided for in the Treaty) in the hands of the ECOFIN Council for the
coordination and monitoring of economic policies of the Member States, to deviate, as far
as pensions are concerned, from what was agreed on in the joint open method of co-
ordination approach. This would certainly be unacceptable in view of the two explicit
requests from the Heads of State and Government regarding the Guidelines. In Lisbon,
the European Council indeed requested that the Guidelines should also focus on reformsaimed at promoting social cohesion. In Göteborg the European Council asked to
incorporate the results of the joint work on pensions into the Guidelines.
Notwithstanding our clear political intentions, this year's Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines do not sufficiently reflect the importance of employment and social policy
objectives. I fully agree with the opinion of the Social Protection Committee on this year's
Guidelines when it states that: "The Guidelines should be a central instrument in
promoting a well co-ordinated policy mix which reflects the articulation between
economic, employment and social policies - the so-called policy triangle - established by
the Lisbon European Council. This should also involve giving greater recognition to the
work being done, under the open method of co-ordination, in relation to the fight against
poverty and social exclusion and on the provision of safe and sustainable pensions, to
give effect to the objective of creating "greater social cohesion" established by
Lisbon."[26]
With regard to one of the fundamental "Lisbon principles", we are certainly not yet where
we should be. What happens with the result of the open co-ordination on pensions in
2003 will be the real "moment of truth".
2.4 Social Protection for Mobile Citizens: Simplifying and Improving the
European Co-ordination of Social Security Systems
Free movement of persons is one of the cornerstones of European integration and one of
the four freedoms enshrined in the EC Treaty. One of the determining factors as to
whether people may enjoy this freedom is the guarantee that administrative barriers will
not affect their social security rights. In 1971, the Council of Ministers therefore adopted
Regulation 1408/71, which guarantees that people moving within the European Union
retain their social security rights.
While this Regulation affords ample protection, one could say that the complexity of the
Regulation and its numerous amendments are an impediment to free movement. That is
why the Belgian Presidency decided to address the fundamental question of how to
proceed with the necessary simplification and improvement of Regulation 1408/71. In
December of last year, the Employment and Social Affairs Council reached an agreement
on a number of principles and basic options (so-called "parameters") which provided the
political framework within which the Council and the European Parliament are now
working on specific reforms for modernising Regulation 1408/71. At the last Social
Affairs Council under the Spanish Presidency (3 June 2002), the Council reached a
political agreement on the general provisions of the new Regulation, which determine
important matters such as the personal and material scope of application (Who is
covered? To which branches of social security does the Regulation apply?) and the
general principles governing the co-ordination of social security (the aggregation of
insured periods, equal treatment and the determination of the competent State - "which
law applies"?). From July onwards, the Danish Presidency will continue negotiations on
the specific chapters of the Regulation. As things are now, we may well find an
agreement on a new co-ordination mechanism, at least at the level of the Council, by the
end of next year.
In this context, we also reached an important political agreement on the conditions for the
extension of Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 to third-country nationals. Such an agreement
would not have been possible without the strong support of the European Commission.The purpose of this extension is to enable third-country nationals in the future to export
their social security rights built up in one Member State to another when moving within
the EU. Until now, this has only been possible for EU nationals.
An example can illustrate the consequences that this has on the current situation: The
daughter of a Moroccan employee working in France is going to study in London. Her
father has been working in France for thirty years. Yet, in principle, he loses the right to
child benefit, despite faithfully paying all his social security contributions.
Last year in December, the Ministers of Social Affairs agreed firstly on the apparently
trivial but politically difficult question of the legal basis for the extension of 1408/71 to
third-country nationals; secondly on the principle that such an extension should apply to
the social security systems of all the Member States. This implies that the United
Kingdom and Ireland have the possibility to join the other Member States in the extension
of the Regulation to third-country nationals by using their right to "opt in". Thirdly, the
Ministers agreed on the fact that the co-ordination applicable to third-country nationals
should give them a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by
citizens of the European Union.
Thanks to the important efforts of the Spanish Presidency and the fact that the UK and
Ireland have indeed decided to opt in, the Social Affairs Council of June 3 2002 reached a
political agreement on this extension of Regulation 1408/71 to third-country nationals. It
is not an exaggeration to say that this agreement represents a milestone in the objective of
the European Union to achieve more equality between EU and non-EU nationals. It will
diminish legal and administrative difficulties for the social security institutions and
should contribute to the establishment of solidarity as well as to a socially just Europe. I
call upon the European Parliament to take up its political responsibility and quickly
deliver their obligatory yet non-binding opinion on this dossier, so that it can take
immediate effect in all Member States from the beginning of next year.
2.5 Open Co-ordination on Health Care and Care for the Elderly
In addition to social inclusion and pensions, a third area has been identified as being
eligible for applying open co-ordination: health care and care for the elderly. Since the
pension challenge is compounded by the increasing cost of health and elderly care in our
societies, an adequate assessment of future social protection requires an integrated
approach. By the next spring European Council, in March of next year, the European
Commission will prepare a full report on this issue, which will give us sufficient elements
to decide upon the conditions for launching an open method of co-ordination in this field.
Even though we should be careful not to start applying the open method of co-ordination
to new areas simply for the sake of "doing something", I do indeed believe that the
growing impact of European integration on national health care systems to which I have
referred, does justify the preparation of some form of European open co-ordination in this
field. Ideally, trilateral co-operation between the Social Protection Committee, the
Economic Policy Committee and a specific Committee (yet to be created) of the Council
of European Health Ministers would be highly interesting, to provide input for the
Commission and the Council. The different Committees involved could focus each on one
of the principles of accessibility, financial sustainability and quality, identified by the
European Council as the main challenges in this field. But the absence of such an
elaborate advisory structure does not mean we cannot get started.2.6 The Legislative Agenda: A Focus on Delivery
My focus in Part 3 of this paper on the work in Convention and the next IGC should not
let us forget that we should be able to round up the Social Policy Agenda agreed in Nice
(December 2000) before then. This agenda encompassed, amongst other things, a certain
amount of legislative activity in the social field (in this section I include employment
policy in my discussion of social policy). Having said this, and engaging in a little crystal
ball gazing, I consider it unlikely that EU legislation in the social field will develop very
significantly over the next few years. This does not mean that EU legislation so far has
been unsuccessful. Just to give two recent examples: the Directives on information and
consultation and on the involvement of workers in European companies[27], were
adopted last year.
It is mainly because this substantive acquis exists that I think an increased focus on
implementation is in order right now. I think there are two related reasons: firstly, the
major differences between the current Member States in their performance in transposing
EU legislation into their national legislation, and, more importantly, the prospect of
enlargement.
In this context it seems only to make sense to say that we should now give priority to the
effective implementation of the current acquis, which is already quite solid and will thus
imply enormous and sustained efforts, especially on the part of the new Member States.
The focus thus is now on delivery. Clearly, what has been decided in the Social Agenda,
at the Nice European Summit, must be carried out.
For certain existing legislative acts the Social Agenda saw scope for revision and
updating. This is the case for the Directives on insolvency[28], exposure to asbestos[29],
and equal treatment of men and women with regard to employment[30]. Within the same
remit falls the simplification and modernisation of the third Regulation ever to be issued
by the Union, now regulated by Regulation 1408/71, which I discussed earlier.
The Social Agenda also called for limited new legislative initiatives. The proposal for a
Directive on temporary work[31] was recently presented by the European Commission.
Negotiations on the Directives concerning the protection of workers from the risk of
vibrations[32] and noise[33] as well as that on the activities of institutions for
occupational retirement provisions are close to being or have already been rounded up
successfully[34].
2.7 European Social Dialogue
The European social dialogue covers on the one hand (bipartite) interprofessional and
sectoral negotiations and on the other (tripartite) consultation on a wide range of issues.
Those who have called social dialogue at European level a success, most often refer to
the bipartite sectoral bargaining between employers and trade unions, which covers no
less than 27 sectors and has produced a range of binding and less binding agreements.
Others, referring to the result of interprofessional negotiation, consider the European
social dialogue to be in its infancy. The fact of the matter is that since the launching of
the "Val Duchesse social dialogue" in 1985, we have progressed from the stage of a mere
discussion between the European social partners to the explicit recognition of their role in
the Treaty and, furthermore, the recognition of the primacy of bargaining channels overlegislative channels. Despite this, interprofessional bargaining has delivered few tangible
results. Today, we are far removed from a true European handling of industrial relations:
only three collective agreements have been reached.
Yet, on the eve of the Laeken European Council, the social partners issued a declaration
in which they expressed their willingness to develop social dialogue by jointly drawing up
a multi-annual work programme, and agreed on the need to develop and improve co-
ordination of tripartite consultation on the various aspects of the Lisbon strategy. In
addition, the recent Barcelona European Council urged the social partners to place their
strategies at the service of the Lisbon Strategy and Objectives. To that end, they are being
asked to produce an annual report on their efforts both at national and at European level,
and to present this to the Social Affairs summit, which from now on will be held before
each spring European Council.
The EU has therefore expressed its willingness on several occasions to grant
responsibility to the social partners. Today, I think it is safe to say that further
development in this area will have to be triggered mainly by the social partners
themselves. It is in the first place up to them to prove that they in turn are willing and able
to become real players at European level. On the other hand, there are certain arguments
in favour of amending the Treaty so as to facilitate European social dialogue, as I will
suggest in Section 3.5.
3 Anchoring Social Protection Policy Through the European Convention and
the IGC: Six Proposals
In Part 1 of this paper I discussed the role the EU should play in the field of social
protection, starting from the role it actually plays. In very general terms, I concluded that
Europe should enable the Member States to develop active welfare states and encourage
intelligent social investment, by indicating the broad objectives, both where employment
and social protection are concerned. And cross-border mobility should create additional
opportunities for intelligent welfare solutions, rather than make welfare policies more
difficult to sustain. In Part 2 I presented the current EU agenda with regard to social
protection, which has gained some momentum since the Lisbon Summit. My survey in
Part 2 also underscores that this momentum depends very much on the political
willingness of Member States' governments to make progress, and thus remains politically
and institutionally fragile. Moreover, the answers to important questions (such as the
proper organisation of patient mobility) remain open, as the Treaty lacks an explicit
balance between the principles of the single market and the principles pursued by national
welfare states. And the efficiency of decision making in the field of social protection can
be improved.
The European Convention and the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)
provide a window of opportunity to anchor this approach to social protection policy to the
EU's architecture, and to find a new and explicit balance between the principles of the
single market and the principles pursued by national welfare states. To give social
protection a proper place in the EU's architecture, six propositions must be considered.
Although I know the Convention may lead to an entirely new text concept for a future
basic Treaty, I have developed these propositions as amendments to the actual Treaty text,
to make my argument as concrete as possible.3.1 Including the Charter of Fundamental Rights Into the Constitutional
Treaty
First, we would have to include the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the constitutional
(basic) Treaty. I consider this rather uncontroversial, firstly, because basic rights are the
essence of every constitution, and secondly, because there is widespread agreement on the
content of the text. Even though this would not grant citizens legally binding entitlements
with immediate effect, it would make the social principles horizontal and thereby give a
clear indication of the fundamental European commitment to the idea that our citizens are
not merely factors of production. More importantly, such an insertion of the Charter
would imply that every action taken by the Union and every action taken by the Member
States in the implementation of Union law, must respect the provisions of the Charter.
3.2 Including a Statement of Fundamental Principles of Social Protection
Policy in the Treaty
In Section 1.1 I discussed the diminished legal authority of Member States, emphasizing
the role of the European Court of Justice. By way of example I referred more particularly
to the famous Kohll and Decker cases, which caused quite a stir throughout Europe
because the Court stated that the special nature of medical services and goods does not
remove them from the ambit of the fundamental principle of freedom of movement.[35]
Now, it would certainly be simplistic to blame the European Court of Justice for the
problems we are confronted with. Firstly, the ECJ can only apply the Treaty provisions by
taking into account the objectives as recognised in the Treaty, but it can of course not
create policy as such. Having said this, and this is my second point, it seems that the ECJ
has in fact developed a coherent theory of social rights, which defines the limits of
European economic integration much more than the EC legislation would suggest. In the
Kohll and Decker cases, for example, the Court took into consideration the financial
balance of the social security system. Still, in the cases under consideration, the balance
tipped in favour of free movement because the Court found that the benefits sought,
namely the reimbursement of a pair of spectacles in the Decker case and the
reimbursement of orthodontic treatment in the Kohll case, were not of the kind to have
significant effect on the financing of the national social security systems.[36]
The Kohll and Decker Rulings were followed in July 2001 by the Smits-Peerbooms
rulings which have further clarified the application of European law to Member States'
health systems. In these judgements, the ECJ confirmed that all Member States must
comply with Community law when exercising the power to organise their social security
systems. The Court further confirmed that medical activities including hospital services
fall within the scope of Article 50 of the Treaty (the freedom to provide services within
the Community). But, the need to maintain the financial balance of social security systems
and the maintenance of a balanced medical and hospital service open to all may justify a
restriction such as is provided for under the system of prior authorization. However, the
Court stated that, in order for a prior administrative authorization scheme to be justified,
even though it derogates from a fundamental freedom, it must, in any event, be based on
objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance, in such a way as to
circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities' discretion so that it is not used
arbitrarily.[37]
The ECJ undoubtedly tries to weigh up the social objectives of the national systems when
deciding upon the applicability of market rules, but it does not have the possibility of
taking into account all the possible - direct but also mainly indirect - consequences of itsdecisions without clearer guidance from the Treaty. Moreover, we cannot be entirely sure
in which direction the Court's rulings will develop in future.
Therefore I fully share the view of Elias Mossialos that we need to agree at the highest
political level on a statement of fundamental principles that enshrines the values and
objectives of European health systems, thus creating a common framework, without
however diminishing the Member States' current degree of autonomy in shaping and
reforming their health care systems.[38] These principles should be incorporated into a
future Treaty, thus balancing the internal market with social goals pursued by Member
States' health care systems.
However, we should not confine the scope of this re-balancing act to health care, but
broaden it to the full realm of social policy. In order to be able to clearly express the idea
that the social dimension is part and parcel of the Union, we should strive for a
reformulation of the general principles of the European Community, as laid down in
Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty. The best way to do this would be to amend, or rather,
complete, Article 3, § 2 which deals with the promotion of equality between men and
women. This new Article could usefully integrate the social acquis jurisprudentiel of the
European Court of Justice. In practice, the new Article could be formulated as follows:
"In all the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to eliminate
inequalities and to promote equality between men and women, and shall take into
account social protection requirements, in particular with a view to promoting accessible
and financially sustainable social protection of high quality, organised on the basis of
solidarity."
Text Proposal
Including a Statement of Fundamental Principles of Social Protection in the
Treaty
Article 3, § 2 concerning equality between men and women (the reference is to the
Amsterdam Treaty) should be completed as follows:
"In all the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to eliminate
inequalities and to promote equality between men and women and shall take into
account social protection requirements, in particular with a view to promoting
accessible and financially sustainable social protection of high quality organised on
the basis of solidarity."
For the sake of consistency, the current Article 6 concerning environmental
protection and the promotion of sustainable development should become Article 3 §
3.
All actions undertaken by the Union would then have to take these principles into
account, as well as the fact that Member States want to preserve their capacity to
implement them via welfare state services and measures. This includes the application
and interpretation of internal market and competition rules by the European Commission,
the European Court of Justice and the Member States, but even more generally theestablishment of Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, Employment Guidelines, etc.
Agreement on such general principles could build upon the mutual understanding we are
now developing by means of the open method of co-ordination, and would in turn specify
the framework for the Member States when they further develop the details of the open
method of co-ordination in different areas.
3.3 Anchoring the Open Method of Co-ordination on Social Policy to the EU's
Architecture
A potential weakness of open co-ordination as it has developed today, is that this kind of
intergovernmental collaboration tends to be highly dependent on the coincidental political
constellation of the moment. In view of the fact that the open method of co-ordination is
not part of the formal acquis we need to think of ways of ensuring that this soft acquis
remains valid after enlargement. The soft acquis should not be seen as yet another hurdle
to be overcome, but as strong support for social policies in the accession countries and the
tangible outcome of the voice social ministers have in the European policy formation
process. Without a doubt the accession countries will be glad to hear that this voice
sounds different as far as social policy is concerned to the voices of international bodies
that they have become accustomed to, such as the IMF and the World Bank.
The enlargement of the EU to 25 Member States will certainly make the processes of
"peer review" and evaluation in the open method of co-ordination more complicated.
Practical feasibility will require simplification (and maybe a revision of the frequency)
and possibly integration of the various processes. I will not elaborate upon this, since my
concern here is with the legal entrenchment of the open method of co-ordination in the
field of social protection.
Given the ambition to establish a coherent and transparent new Treaty, it seems logical to
argue, within the Convention, for the inclusion of the open method of co-ordination as
one of the general instruments of the Union. This could be done in the planned article of
the constitutional Treaty that would describe all the Union's instruments. This general
article would give a description of the basic features of the open method of co-ordination.
Such a "generic" article could even encompass the processes of policy co-ordination
which are already established in the actual Treaty, such as the employment process (art.
128). The specific application of the open method of co-ordination to employment could
then be developed in more detail in the employment chapter of the Treaty, the specific
application to social protection and social inclusion could be developed in the social
provisions of the Treaty [39], etc. One should engage in such a "generic definition"
exercise with due precaution, since there are political risks involved: for instance,
proposing a "bottom line" description of all types of co-ordination in the EU might
damage what has already been achieved with regard to co-ordination in the field of
employment.
Whether or not such a generic definition of open co-ordination is indicated in the new
Treaty is beyond the brief of this paper. Hence, I will not venture into this horizontal
exercise here, but confine myself to proposing a legal basis for open co-ordination as
specifically applied in the field of social protection and social inclusion. This legal basis
should build upon the learning process which we are now experiencing, and which I
therefore set out in Part 2, and should meet the following requirements:
– make it clear that open co-ordination applies to two specific subject matters in thebroad social policy field: the modernisation of social protection and the promotion of
social inclusion (to signal that we do not want open co-ordination to replace "hard
EU law", in those domains where a "hard law" approach is indicated);
– make it unambiguously clear that open co-ordination on subject matters will not
depend on political good will, but be stated as an obligation by the Treaty (hence the
expression "shall");
– give an active role to the Commission, yet taking into account the prominent and
positive role played by the Social Protection Committee in shaping the social
ministers' common political identity over the past two years;
– define the role of the European Parliament, and of the social partners (called
"management and labour" in the Treaty's jargon);
– provide for the possibility, yet not the obligation, of developing guidelines (it seems
easier, at this stage, to envisage the development of guidelines with regard to social
inclusion, than with regard to a highly sensitive area such as pensions);
– require the incorporation of the results of the process into the Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines (for convenience, I use the expression "Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines", referring to the Treaty as it stands today; maybe the Convention will opt
for a broader concept, such as "Broad Economic and Employment Guidelines").
Since the Nice Treaty has introduced the Social Protection Committee via article 144 I
suggest to label this new article "144bis"; given the ambition to reshape the whole Treaty,
this is obviously merely a matter of presentation here.
Text Proposal (article "144bis")
Anchoring the Open Method of Co-ordination With Regard to Social Protection
and Inclusion to the Treaty
In the fields referred to in Articles 137, paragraph 1, (j) and (k), (*)
the Council,
on the basis of the conclusions of the European Council,
pursuant to a consensus between the Member States, on a proposal from the
Commission, which takes into account the opinion of the Social Protection
Committee, and after consulting the European Parliament, management and labour,
and the Social Protection Committee,
shall
- adopt a set of commonly agreed objectives and commonly agreed indicators,
- if appropriate, draw up guidelines which the Member States shall take into account in
their policy,
- adopt reports on the implementation of this co-operation process.
The result of this process shall be incorporated into the Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines.
(*) Reference is to the Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by the Treaty
of Nice.
One may note that the proposed legal base does not exclude co-operation between the
Social Protection Committee and, for instance, the Economic Policy Committee, as hasbeen the case so far (and with good effect) in the open co-ordination on pensions. In
practice, it suffices that the European Council demands this co-operation.
3.4 Strengthening the Social Provisions of the Treaty
My fourth proposal deals with the social provisions of the Treaty, which can be found in
Articles 136 and 137 of the Treaty . The new formulations of the social provisions since
Amsterdam allow us to conclude that the social objectives of the Union are being
accepted as independent ones, despite the fact that the central place of the subsidiarity
principle still holds, meaning that social policy is still primarily a matter for Member
States, as should be the case. The scope of these articles is in my view sufficiently large,
and a wide range of subjects in the field of social policy fall within the scope of the
provisions. However, we have to change the decision-making procedure applicable to the
social provisions of the Treaty, some of which are still governed by the rule of unanimity
in the Council. As said before, the perspective of enlargement calls for the generalisation
of qualified majority voting (QMV), also in this area; as a minimum minimorum QMV
should certainly apply to the technical co-ordination of social security systems
(Regulation 1408/71; Art. 42 of the Treaty).
I am aware that some (current and new) Member States consider the shift to qualified
majority voting in all social provisions an attempt to oblige them to give up their
competitive advantages in social terms, which they sometimes see as compensation for
geographical and capital stock disadvantages. I would like to address this fear by
mentioning three elements. My first argument is substantive: We should not forget that
cumulative scientific evidence has further corroborated, since the Dutch Presidency in
1992, that social protection is a productive factor and not an impediment to
competitiveness. My second argument is institutional: even if we were able to finally
abandon the unanimity rule for decision-making on social policy at the next
Intergovernmental Conference, it is clear that a broad coalition of the accession countries,
possibly supported by one or two of the current Member States, could easily, and rightly,
block decision-making in this respect. Rightly, indeed, since we would be making a bad
start with the unification of Europe if the Union were to immediately twist the arms of the
accession countries. Finally, I believe we can attach the necessary conditions to ensure
that such an extension of QMV will not impose unacceptably high burdens on the
Member States. The conditions that have already been agreed upon in Article 137 of the
Treaty and which refer, amongst others, to minimum requirements and unnecessary
administrative and financial constraints, can serve as a source of inspiration.[40]
3.5 Facilitating European Social Dialogue
It can be argued that it is necessary to simplify the complicated Treaty-based legal
framework surrounding social dialogue at European level. Indeed, in some cases
unanimity is required to "declare generally binding/implement" the outcome of the
negotiations in the Council, whereas in other cases qualified majority suffices. Most of the
time different voting procedures apply to different aspects of one single agreement and,
quite often, legal services of the institutions involved do not agree on the relevant
decisional procedures. Furthermore, the range of subjects on which bargaining can be
initiated remains limited in the Treaty and excludes important aspects such as pay. Here,
too, a great deal of legal uncertainty arises from the question of whether or not certain
parts of potential agreements do or do not fall within the remit of the subjects on which
negotiation is allowed.There are some arguments to say that social partners should be able to decide for
themselves which issues relating to employment they want to negotiate on (or in other
words: abandon the provisions in the Treaty that limit the scope of negotiations). Also,
European social dialogue could be helped if all European collective agreements could be
declared legally binding by QMV.
Text Proposal
Facilitating Social Dialogue at Community Level
Article 139 TEC concerning the social dialogue should be amended as follows:
"1. Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at
Community level may lead to contractual relations, including agreements.
2. Agreements concluded at Community level shall be implemented either in
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and
(sic) the Member States or, in matters covered by Article 137, including pay, the
right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs, at the joint
request of the signatory parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from the
Commission.
The Council shall act by qualified majority, except where the agreement in question
contains one or more provisions relating to one of the areas referred to in Article
137(3), in which case it shall act unanimously."
3.6 Respecting Agreements Between Social Partners at National Level,
and Services of Genreal Interest
A final point before I conclude refers to the social dialogue at the level of the Member
States, which is directly affected by European competition rules through two Treaty
provisions.
Article 81 paragraph 1 of the Treaty prohibits "all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market." For a long time, there
has been a lot of uncertainty about the status of agreements concluded in the framework
of collective negotiations between social partners as far as the application of this Treaty
Article is concerned. In recent years the European Court of Justice introduced important
clarifications, for example in the Albany case, regarding the Dutch system of compulsory
affiliation to an occupational pension scheme. In this famous case the Court stated,
amongst others, that "the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be
seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to Article [81](1) of the
Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and
employment."
A similar reasoning has been followed by the Court with regard to Article 86 paragraph 2
of the Treaty, which deals with undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest. Recent Court rulings have given a rather flexible interpretation
of the concept of "service of general economic interest," which traditionally alwayscovered services of a purely economic nature. Thus, the Court considers that
"undertakings" (e.g. sectoral pension funds) entrusted with an essential social function or
with a particular social task of general interest (e.g. when they play a major role in the
national pensions system) have to be regarded as "undertakings entrusted with the
operation of services of general economic interest," which may benefit, pursuant to
Article 86(2) EC, from a derogation of the competition rules of the Treaty.
In view of this case-law of the Court of Justice, it seems appropriate to insert a new
provision in Article 81(1) EC according to which agreements concluded in the context of
collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of social policy
objectives do not fall within the scope of the Treaty provisions applying to undertakings.
It would equally seem appropriate to reflect on the Court's flexible interpretation of the
concept of "service of general economic interest in the Treaty."
Text Proposal
Social Dialogue at National Level Rules Applying to Undertakings -
Services of General Interest
1. Insert in Article 81 EC, the following provision: "Agreements concluded in the
context of collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of
social policy objectives do not fall within the scope of Article 81(1) EC."
2. Modify Article 86(2) EC in the following way: "Undertakings entrusted with the
operation of services of general economic interest or entrusted with a social task of
general interest ..."
An alternative proposal would be to adapt Article 86(2) EC as follows:
"Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic or social
interest ..."
A further alternative would be to delete the reference to "economic". Article 86(2)
EC would then read as follows: "Undertakings entrusted with the operation of
services of general interest ..."
Summary & Conclusion
My inquiry into the role the EU should play in the field of social protection started from
an empirical question: What role does the EU play in the development of social
protection? The facts point to two conclusions. Firstly, Member States have lost more
control over national welfare policies in the face of pressures from integrated markets
than the EU has de facto gained in transferred authority, substantial though the latter may
be. Thus, there is a growing gap in our steering capacity with regard to welfare policy.
This is problematic, since the combination of diminished Member State autonomy and
authority and continued weakness in developing responses at EU level may restrict both
the scope and the pressure for innovative social investment, which is needed everywhere
given the common challenges created by the dynamics of demographic ageing. The
problem will be exacerbated by EU enlargement because the requirement of unanimity in
the Council for important areas of social policy entails the risk of paralysis of decision-
making in the social field, and, probably even more importantly, because enlargement willbring about dramatic increases in the economic, social, politico-cultural and politico-
institutional heterogeneity among EU Member States.
Secondly, in a context of increased mobility, not just of workers and capital, but also of
service organisations, care providers and patients, the Treaty constellation might prioritise
two polarised trajectories, as Leibfried and Pierson fear: core welfare state components
(redistribution, pay-as-you-go, etc.) would remain "intervention-free", to the extent that
they are "pure" welfare; but the more these functions are provided by market-based
services, the more the welfare state (in whole or in parts) would tilt towards the sphere of
"economic action" from the point of view of the EU institutions, thus becoming subject to
single market principles and market regimes. Thereby the welfare state could gradually be
submerged into a single European "security" market, that is, a single market for personal
protection and insurance instruments. Yet, although it would be unfair to blame "Europe"
for some of the difficulties facing national social policy makers if they choose to rely
more on market or quasi-market mechanisms in their welfare provision, the Treaty
provides no robust guarantee against such a polarised development.
However, the answer to this problem is not an additional transfer of national
competencies to the EU, nor the imposition of uniformity, let alone harmonisation for the
sake of harmonisation. Although I stress that the concept of "a European social model"
not only makes sense but should be specified by means of common objectives, I also think
national diversity with regard to social protection systems cannot be treated as
illegitimate. On the contrary, diversity is itself part of the legitimating structure of beliefs
and practices supporting the multilevel European polity. Although there is a proper role
for EU legislation in the social domain, social protection policy is and should primarily
remain the responsibility of municipalities, regions and nation states. Nevertheless,
Europe should enable the Member States to develop active welfare states and encourage
intelligent social investment, by indicating the broad objectives, both where employment
and social protection are concerned. And cross-border mobility should create additional
opportunities for intelligent welfare solutions, rather than make welfare policies more
difficult to sustain.
I hope to have shown in the second part of the paper that social protection policy - so
conceived - has gained some momentum with the Lisbon Summit. Yet, this progress
remains politically and institutionally fragile. Moreover, the answers to important
questions (such as the proper organisation of patient mobility) remain open, as the Treaty
lacks an explicit balance between the principles of the single market and the principles
pursued by national welfare states. And the efficiency of decision making in the field of
social protection can be improved.
Therefore, I table six proposals:
Firstly, we would have to include the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the
constitutional Treaty.
Secondly, to express clearly the idea that the social dimension is part and parcel of the
Union, it is crucial to reformulate the general principles of the European Community, as
laid down in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, to anchor a commitment to social protection
to the new Treaty. Since this principle would have a "horizontal" nature, all actions
undertaken by the Union would have to take it into account, as well as the fact that
Member States want to preserve their capacity to implement that principle via welfare
services and measures.
Thirdly, we need a legal basis for the open method of co-ordination as it is to be appliedin the field of social protection and social inclusion. This legal basis should build upon
the learning process which we are now experiencing, and which I therefore set out in Part
2. It should spell out clearly the role of the European Parliament, the Commission, the
Social Protection Committee, and the social partners. It should also guarantee the transfer
of the results of the open method of co-ordination in the social domain to the economic
and budgetary policy co-ordination on the level of the Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines.
Fourthly, enlargement demands that we increase the efficiency of decision-making with
regard to the social provisions of the Treaty, some of which are still governed by the rule
of unanimity. As a minimum minimorum QMV should certainly apply to the technical
co-ordination of social security systems.
Fifthly, social partners should be able to decide for themselves which issues relating to
employment they want to negotiate, and European social dialogue could be helped if all
European collective agreements could be declared legally binding by QMV.
Finally, in view of this case-law of the Court of Justice, it seems appropriate to insert a
new provision in Article 81(1) EC according to which agreements concluded in the
context of collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of social
policy objectives do not fall within the scope of the Treaty provisions applying to
undertakings. It would equally seem appropriate to reflect on the Court's flexible
interpretation of the concept of "service of general economic interest in the Treaty."
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